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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 1, 1996 Congress passed the Communications Decency
Act (CDA) as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.1 The CDA
amended section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934,2 which
regulates obscene and harassing telephone calls, by adding a new
subsection (d).3 Under the amended section, it would be illegal to use
an "interactive computer service" to send or display any communication
available to a person under eighteen years of age that, "in context,
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs.'"'

1. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. 5, § 502, 110
Stat. 136 (1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (West. Supp. 1997))
[hereinafter "CDA'1,
2. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994),
3. CDA, supra note 1, at § 223(d).
4. Id. at § 223(d)(A)-(B).
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A broad array of charges were made about the parade of horribles that
would result from the liability created under the CDA. Many felt that
the CDA would have a chilling effect on free speech that would, in turn,
threaten the new form of "community'' developing in "cyberspace."5
Others questioned the necessity and/or appropriateness of government's
usurping the responsibility for children's well-being-believing it is
better left to parents.6 Still others feared the return of what they believe
to be the overly-moralizing, self-righteous attitudes associated with the
Comstock Laws of the late nineteenth century. 7
This Article does not address the larger social issues .raised by those
claims except to conclude that Congress's misunderstanding of, or
disregard for, the relevant issues threatens the growth and well-being of
online communities. Many have made legitimate and convincing
arguments against the stated and perhaps less forthright goals of the
CDA. However, the CDA is also problematic on a more fundamental
level: it is filled with ambiguities and inconsistencies of language.
The problems with the language of the CDA are the result of careless
drafting and reflect an awkward and hurried attempt at compromise
among congresspersons. The stated intentions of the CDA expose a
general lack of understanding of the mechanisms and environment
Congress sought to regulate. In addition, Congress revealed a remarkable insensitivity to the First Amendment. Specifically, Congress
misread (or disregarded) the rationale permitting the abridgement of
certain otherwise free speech in the broadcast medium and attempted to

5. See generally Wll.LIAM GIBSON, NEUROMANCER (1984); see also Glossary,
PUB. RELATIONS J., May 1995, at 34 (describing the term "cyberspace" as: ''the virtual
computer world and the society that gathers around it").
6. See Thomas E. Weber, Keep Out! Software Will Help Parents Screen
Potentially Offensive Sites, Wt>J..L ST. J., Mar. 28, 1996, at Rl4; Amy Dunkin (ed.),
Cybersmut: How to Lock Out the Kids, Bus. WK., Feb. 12, 1996, at 98. See also
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the First Amendment protects
the right of Amish parents to refuse to send their children to high school).
7. See Margaret A. Blanchard, The American Urge to Censor: Freedom of

Expression Versus the Desire to Sanitize Society-From Anthony Comstock to 2 Live
Crew, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 741 (1992); David M. Rabban, The Free Speech
League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions ofthe Free Speech in American History,
45 STAN. L. REv. 47 (1992); Wade Rowland, The Communications Decency Act,
Censorship and the Net (visited Jan. 29, 1998) <http://www.blue-cat.com/
bcat/articleS.btml>.
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foist it wholesale onto a new and different medium. The result was a
statute that was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.8
Notwithstanding the CDA's shortcomings, it will be important to
identify the most problematic features of the CPA and attempt to
comprehend their meaning. On June 11, 1996, a federal court in
Philadelphia ruled that the CDA unconstitutionally abridged rights
protected by the First and Fifth Amendments.9 The Justice Department
appealed that ruling and the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on
March 19, 1997. On June 26, 1997, the Court struck down the CDA,
finding that in its attempt to shield minors from indecent material on the
Internet, Congress had unconstitutionally abridged the First Amendment
rights of adults. 10
•
Although the CDA is now dead, many in Congress remain adamant
in their conviction that some form of regulation of cyberspace is
necessary to protect the well-being of the nation's children.11 In fact,
efforts to draft some sort of "CDA II" are already underway. 12
II.

PROBLEMS WITII CDA TERMINOLOGY

The wording of the CDA made it difficult to determine who would be
liable under the law. Specifically, terms not clearly defined by the Act
(''telecommunications device") or terms not defined at all ("telecommunications facility") left a wide range of participants in the telecommunications industry unsure of their potential liability under the CDA. In
addition, contradictory language associated with "interactive computer
services" left providers of those services, including content creators and
telecommunications equipment and service providers, unsure of their
status under the law.
A step-by-step walk through the CDA from the beginning reveals
several problems and provokes as many questions. Some problems
appear at first more compelling and far-reaching; however, even the

See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
ACLU v. Reno, No. CIV.A. 96-963, 1996 WL 65464 (E.D. Pa. Feb. IS, 1996).
10. Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2334.
1I. See generally Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995,
Mar. 30, 1995 s. Rep. No. 104-23 (1995); 141 CONG. REC. S8310 (1995); Andrew
Kantor ed., CDA Overturned, but Other Legislation Looms, INTERNET WORLD, Sept.
1996, at 16.
12. See Jane Black, New CDA Legislation Expected (visited Oct. 1, 1997)
<http://www.news.com/News/Item/0,4,119380,00.html>; see also Washington Wire,
WAU ST. J., Nov. 14, 1997, at Al (reporting that Sen. Dan Coats (R-Jnd.) recently
introduced a bill to Congress dubbed "son of CDA" which would replace the CDA's
indecency standard with a "harinful to minors" standard); see also discussion of"harmful
to minors" standard, infra Part V.C.
8.
9.
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wording with the most seemingly innocuous ambiguities posed serious
problems for those trying to assess their exposure to the severe criminal
penalties imposed by the CDA.

A.

Undefined Terms

1. Reach Over Foreign Persons or Entities
The :first sentence of the CDA, amended section (a)(l)(A) of the
Communications Act of 1934, refers to activities "in interstate or foreign
communications."13 It is not defined here or elsewhere in the CDA
what Congress intended by including the word "foreign" or its expectations of whom the CDA might reach by its inclusion. The Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution14 grants Congress the power
to create and enforce laws with respect to both domestic and foreign
commercial activity. 15 The legislative history of the Communications
Act of 1934 notes that ''the general purposes of the Act make clear that
the Congress intended to exercise its full authority under the commerce
clause."16 Indeed, the word "foreign" is included in the original section
223 of the Communications Act of 1934.17 However, that section
referred only to communications by telephone, and therefore may have
been limited to persons or entities affirmatively calling into the United
States, purposefully employing the United States telephone infrastructure.
While Congress in 1934 may have been exercising its ''full authority"
under the Commerce Clause pursuant to the Zeitgeist of the times,18

13. CDA, supra note 1, at § 502(a)(l)(A).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15. See Douglas B. McFadden, Antitrost and Communications: Changes After the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 457, 469 (1997).
16. See H.R. Rep. No. 90-1109 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1915,
1919.
17. 47 U.S.C. § 151-610 (1982), amended by 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1996).
18. In the years just prior to the passage of the Communications Act of 1934, the
Supreme Court struck down a number of laws supported by President Franklin Roosevelt
on the grounds that they exceeded the scope of the Commerce Clause. Many believe
that President Franklin Roosevelt's proposed plan in the 1930s to ''pack" the Supreme
Court by increasing the number of Justices sitting on the court prompted the then sitting
Justices to later defer to the Executive and Legislative branches on the matter of the
scope of the Commerce Clause. See Henry J. Abraham, Reflections on the Contemporary Status of Our Civil Rights and Liberties and the Bill ofRights, 13 J.L. & POL. 7,
20 (1997).
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there are at least two reasons why it cannot be assumed that Congress
meant to subject any communication with an in international aspect to
the CDA.
First, as discussed more fully below, the transparent methods by which
pack-switched networks such as the Internet arbitrarily and inconsistently
employ a foreign telecommunications infrastructure, even when the
sender and receiver of a communication are next door to each other, is
fundamentally different from ordinary telephony. This difference
between voice communications contemplated by the Communications
Act of 1934 and the Telecommunications Act of 1996 on the one hand,
and the advanced telecommunications and information services
contemplated by the CDA on the other, was not fully discussed in the
legislative history of the CDA. Second, "foreign communications" per
se were not discussed at all in the legislative history of the CDA of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. The phrase, "interstate or foreign
communications," was simply grafted from the existing parts of the 1934
law.
Because the amended section replaces the word "telephone" with the
term ''telecommunications device," the appropriateness of including the
word "foreign" may need to be reevaluated. The Internet, for example,
employs "packet-switching" technology which breaks communications
into parts and employs multiple, often geographically diverse, telecommunications mechanisms to deliver and then reassemble those parts. 19
The path of the message parts, and, therefore, the number and location
of telecommunications mechanisms, is volatile and arbitrary from the
perspective of the sender and receiver of a communication.20 One who
sends a communication using a telecommunications device (depending
upon how that term is defined) may in fact be employing a foreign
telecommunications infrastructure, and thus be potentially liable under
this section of the CDA. This may be the case even where the sender
and receiver are within the same jurisdiction.
It may be that Congress is attempting to reach foreign persons or
entities who "reach in" to the United States via use of the American
telecommunications infrastructure, even if they do so unintentionally
(due to non-user-controlled packet-switching, for example). If the sender
and receiver of a prohibited communication both reside in foreign

19. See Christopher Libertelli, Internet Telephony Architecture and Federal Access
Change Reform, 2 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 13, 13 (1996).
20. Packet-switching technology takes advantage of efficiencies in traffic flow of
telecommunications. The route of message parts is determined by available capacity
among several alternative routes. See John L. Keller, GTE Planning to Buy BBN,
Internet Pioneer, WALL ST. J., May 6, 1997, at B6.
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jurisdictions, however, the violator can hardly be said to be under the
proper jurisdiction of Congress. Moreover, the protection of foreign
"victims" is not Congress's concern.
In addition, Congress may be seeking to ensure that violators of the
CDA are not shielded from liability by the deliberate use of "foreign
communications" to send prohibited communications. As explained,
however, the route of any communication over the Internet cannot be
directed by the sender. Moreover, from the user's perspective, the same
lack of control over routing applies to all forms of telecommunications.
Neither the user of a telephone, nor a computer with a modem, nor a
wireless device is cognizant of, nor has control over, the route of
transmission of his or her communication.
Congress's use of the term "foreign communications" may reflect
nothing more than its intention to reach prohibited communications
initiated in foreign jurisdictions but which ultimately reach the United
States. In this sense, the use of the term would seem to parallel the
intention of the original Communications Act of 1934 regarding, inter
alia, obscene or harassing telephone calls. Nevertheless, with the
complex nature of modem telecommunications transmission, e.g. packetswitching, and the convergence of distinct forms of communications
across the telecommunications infrastructure (voice, data, e-mail, etc.) it
may be that extending the CDA to "foreign communications" packs an
unintended, over-inclusive punch.

2.

"Telecommunications Facility" and 'Vicarious Liability

Amended section 223(a)(2) extends liability for prohibited activities
under amended section 223(a)(l) to anyone who "knowingly permits any
telecommunications facility under his control to be used for any
[prohibited activity] . . . with the intent that it be used for such
activity."21 Unfortunately, but not surprisingly, the term "telecommunications facility" is not defined either in the CDA or the larger Telecommunications Act of 1996.
Whatever definition is imputed to the term, at first glance it would
seem unlikely that any person or entity controlling a "telecommunications facility" would unwittingly subject itself to liability under this
section of the CDA since the wording requires both intent and knowl21.

CDA, supra note l, at§ 502(a)(2).
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edge. On the other hand, a precise definition of the term "telecommunications facility" will be important for Internet service providers {IAP),22
so-called "interactive computer services," and even the "enhanced
services"23 provided by telephone companies and others.
Specifically, the lack of a definition for the term "telecommunications
facility" renders it subsumable under telecommunication devices or even
interactive computer services. Because sections (a)(l)(A)-(B) of the
CDA contemplate communications "by means of a telecommunications
device," telecommunications facilities must be distinct from mere
devices in order to be spared under these sections. As discussed below,
because telecommunications device is defined only with reference to
what is not contemplated by that term, facilities that may be considered
''telecommunications facilities" are even more vulnerable. Indeed, the
intuitive relationship between telecommunications devices and facilities
is obvious: one can easily imagine a telecommunications facility
comprised of telecommunications devices. Whatever is to be understood
by the two terms, the distinction between them must be made clear.
In addition, telecommunications facilities may be subsumed by
interactive computer services. At first glance, the distinction between a
computer and an element of telecommunications equipment- "device"
or "facility" - may seem clear. The definition of interactive computer
service provided by the CDA, however, refers to (1) "information
systems," (2) providing access "by multiple users to a computer server,"
and (3) "a system that provides access to the Internet." As discussed
later in this section, telecommunications infrastructure providers such as
telephone companies are increasingly and actively engaged in the
provision and maintenance of information systems (e.g., frame relay
service).
Systems that provide multiple users access to a computer server
necessarily use modems and, therefore, necessarily use "telecommunications equipment." By including in the definition of interactive computer
service these systems and systems that provide access to the Internet,

22. Internet service providers provide access to the Internet over dial-up telephone
Jines. Some Internet service providers house server computers which temporarily store
data for individual subscribers to access at will. The service house enhanced
telecommunications facilities which provide speedier access to the Internet.
23. Telephone companies, which are normally regulated as common carriers and
are not liable for content traveling over their lines, may be liable in their .provision of
enhanced services if they "create or control the intelligence" of the commumcation. See
i,ifra Part II.B.3; see also, Anthony L. Clapes, Proceed With Caution-Information
Superhighway Under Construction: Selecting the Proper Intellectual Property Right
Paradigm to Apply to Passengers on the Interim-net, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT.
621, 624 (I 996).
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Congress has forced the contemplation of at least some telecommunications equipment and infrastructure within the meaning of interactive
computer service.
The first of the two principal provisions of the CDA refers to
communications by means of a telecommunications device. The second
provision refers to the use of interactive computer services. Because it
is arguably contemplated by both of these terms, a telecommunications
facility, whatever it is, may be subject to virtually the entire CDA.
Once telecommunications facilities are endowed with a precise
definition, assuming that definition wholly distinguishes them from both
telecommunications devices and interactive computer services, liability
under the CDA as discussed at the beginning of this section appears
limited to identical subsections (a)(2) and (d)(2) (addressing telecommunications devices and interactive computer services respectively).
In these subsections, liability is limited to those who "knowingly
permit any telecommunications facility under his control [to be used to
transmit a prohibited communication] with the intent that it be used for
such activity." The wording provides the relatively lilnited reach to
those actors with both knowledge and intent. However, as discussed in
detail below, the question of control of telecommunications facilities is
problematic.
3.

Online Service Providers, Internet Service Providers, and the
CDAs "Control of Facilities" Language

If the term ''telecommunications facility'' is to include the computer
servers and broadband telecommunications lines used by IAPs,24 and
if those facilities are deemed to be controlled by the IAPs, then IAPs
may be liable under the CDA notwithstanding other language in the Act
which would tend to shield them. Specifically, the defenses included in
the CDA, discussed in detail below, arguably include language which
would shield from liability all the typical activities of an Internet service
provider.
It seems clear that the commercial online service providers, such as
CompuServe and America Online ("AOL"), control the systems to which

24. Internet service providers own or lease a high speed, high capacity telecommunications link to the Internet Subscribers to IAPs dial into the IAP's location via a
computer modem and home telephone line.
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their customers connect. On the other hand, most of the commercial
online service providers also provide their customers with access to the
Internet. The Internet and the thousands of computers and telecommunications facilities and devices that it employs are not controlled by any
one entity.
The question remains of whether an IAP such as AOL could be liable
for material found on its proprietary system but not liable for material
accessed on the Internet via AOL. Anyone who has used one of the
commercial online services knows that this division in the application of
liability would be cumbersome and difficult to apply and enforce. On
the America Online service, for example, the distinction between content
provided by AOL, its subscribers, or its licensed content providers and
content originating from the Internet is becoming increasingly blurred.
Because "hyperlinks" appear throughout the service by which one can
seamlessly switch back and forth between AOL content and the Internet,
all but the most experienced user may be unaware that he has left the
confines of AOL's huge computer server in Vienna, Virginia.
Thus, for AOL and the other commercial online services, liability
cannot effectively be divided based on the origin of the content available
on their services. Moreover, even if AOL and the others could shield
themselves from liability based on the fact that some of their content
arrives via the Internet, Congress's goal to protect children from obscene
or indecent communications would be largely undermined.25 Indeed,
because all of the commercial online services are currently considering
providing access to their services through Internet World Wide Web
pages, AOL and the other services could avoid liability for the prohibited acts of their subscribers and/or licensed content providers simply by
changing the way their services are delivered.

B.
1.

Unclear Definitions

"Telecommunications Device"

The first of the two principal sections of the CDA refers to prohibited
communications ''by means of a telecommunications device." "Telecommunications device," however, is nowhere defined in either the CDA or
the larger Telecommunications Act. The CDA provides that "interactive
computer services" are not telecommunications devices, but othenvise

25. In fact, because the commercial online services provide the lion's share of
Internet access to private residences, their exclusion from liability under the CDA would
render almost ineffective Congress's intention to provide for contributory or vicarious
liability.
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leaves the term undefined.26 An argument may be made that by
subtracting interactive computer services, a term that is defined in the
CDA, we are left with a more-or-less identifiable subset of equipment.
Specifically, one might conclude that the term ''telecommunications
device" seeks to update the word ''telephone" in the Communications
Act of 1934 to include fax machines, cellular phones, pagers, and other
voice or signaling-related equipment.
The fact that the CDA attempts to exclude ''interactive computer
services" from the definition of "telecommunications device" is
unhelpful. First, it is unclear whether the Internet as a whole is to be
considered an interactive computer service. The definition of an
interactive computer service, provided in section 230(t)(2) of the CDA,
includes "a service or system that provides access to the Internet." A
self-contained computer server with a single connection to the Internet
may indeed be owned and controlled by a single person or entity-a
distinction that the CDA emphasizes elsewhere in the statute as one
determinant of liability. The Internet as a whole, however, is neither
owned or controlled by a single entity nor limited to even the most
broad definition of ''telecommunications device." Indeed, it is hard to
imagine a device or service contemplated anywhere in the CDA that
does not, or could not, somehow relate to the Internet.
Notwithstanding the undefined term ''telecommunications device," and
the difficulties that arise when inferring which devices it contemplates,
the use of the term "lmowingly'' effectively limits the devices and
activities associated with them that are reached under that section of the
Act.27 Telephones, fax machines, cellular phones, and pagers are all
examples of point-to-point communications devices.28 Except in the
case of a misdialed identifying number, a communicator affirmatively
communicates with or to a specific person with those devices. Thus, one
who initiates a prohibited communication to a specific person using a
point-to-point device does so knowingly. In contrast, the use of devices
contemplated under the term "interactive computer service"29 may, by
the nature of those systems, result in a prohibited communication being
CDA, supra note 1, at § 230(f)(2).
CDA, supra note I, at§ 223(a)(l)(A)-(B).
See Moskowitz, Robert, Nifty New Phone Features at your Fingertips; Enjoy
Phones that Follow You and Make Calls Without You, INVESTORS Bus. DAILY, July 13,
1995, at Al.
29. The meaning of"interactive computer service" is discussed infra at Part 11.B.2.
26.

27.
28.

1121

received by a person protected under the Act without the lmowledge of
the sender.
The "intent" requirement of amended section 223(a)(l)(A) also limits
the application of the Act to certain devices, the use of which may result
in liability under that section. Subsection (a)(l)(A) requires the "intent
to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person" to be liable under
the CDA. This effectively precludes from the reach of the section the
user of a point-to-multipoint3° device whose communication may reach
an unintended recipient.
Whereas, the "lmowingly'' and "intent" requirements may effectively
protect users of point-to-multipoint devices such as computer networks,
other language in amended sections 223(a)(l)(A)-(B) would seem to
sweep in most devices not specifically included within the definition of
interactive computer services.31 The CDA refers to the transmission of
any "comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication which is obscene. . . or indecent."32 An "image" is precisely
what fax machines and other data-based devices transmit. In addition,
the phrase "other communication" would seem to serve as a catch-all for
any other communication not specifically associated with an interactive
computer service, which is the only "device" the CDA tells us is not a
telecommunications device.
Thus, the intent and knowledge requirements of amended section
223(a) together with the exclusion of interactive computer services from
the definition of telecommunications device may effectively limit the
kinds of devices contemplated under the section. Nevertheless,
undefined terms in legislation aimed at the telecommunications industry
is unproductive and unfair: rapid development of new technologies and
convergence of the telecommunications and computer industries will lead
to increased uncertainty in assessing liability under the CDA. Moreover,
by employing another problematic term of the CDA (interactive
computer services) in an attempt to enlighten the meaning of telecommunications device, Congress has only further confused the matter.

30. An example of a point-to-multipoint device might be a posting from a home
computer to an electronic bulletin board residing on a server computer. From this
bulletin board, multiple parties may have access. See Kelly Tickle, The Vicarious
Liability of Electronic Bulletin Board Operators for the Copyright Infringement
Occurring on Their Bulletin Boards, 80 IOWA L. R.Ev. 391, 392 (1996).
31. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 230(e)(2) (codified at 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 230(e)(2) (West Supp. 1997)).
32. CDA, supra note I, at§ 223(a)(l)(A)(ii).
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2.

Scope of "Interactive Computer Service" Under the CDA

The CDA adds a new subsection (d) to section 223 of the Communications Act of 1934.33 This subsection imposes liability for knowingly
using an "interactive computer service" to send to a specific person
under the age of eighteen, or "display in a manner available" to a person
under the age of eighteen, "patently offensive" material as measured by
"contemporary community standards."34
The "display in a manner available" language in this subsection is
potentially the most far-reaching part of the CDA. It may reach anyone
who posts objectionable material from anywhere in the world to
anywhere on the Internet or other computer services. After all, without
the use of filtering software35 or other blocking controls, postings to the
Internet are available to anyone with access to one of the hundreds of
thousands of servers connected to that ''network of networks. " 36
In addition, there is the ambiguity in the requirement of ''using'' an
interactive computer service to be reached by the Act, and the nonrequirement of "initiating'' the communication. A similar ambiguity
exists in subsection (a). With this vague language, Congress has left
unanswered the question of what the difference is between using a
service and initiating a communication.
It is also important to determine precisely what is to be included
within the meaning of"interactive computer service." Section 502(g)(2)
of the CDA provides that the term has the meaning provided in new
section 230(f)(2). That section defines "interactive computer service" as
"any information services, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to
the Internet . . . ."

33. CDA, supra note 1, at § 502.
34. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488-89 (1957); Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 21 (1973).
35. See supra note 6.
36. The Internet is a "network of networks" because it is comprised of thousands
of "local area" network&-such as those in the workplace or on college and university
campuses. The networks are not directly connected to one another, but, rather, make
"contact'' using communication protocols and address schemes.
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However, subsection (e)(l) of section 502 of the CDA provides that
no person will be liable under subsections (a) and (d) for having solely
provided access or connection to or from a facility, system, of network
not under that provider's control. The question then becomes, "Does a
provider 'control' the facility, system, or network to which he is
providing access?"
An interactive computer service is the only potential victim of the
CDA for which Congress has provided an allegedly complete definition.
In its entirety, section 230(f)(2) reads:
The term "interactive computer service" means any infonnation service, system,
or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system
that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services
offered by libraries or educational institutions.

This definition potentially sweeps in everything from the largest
telecommunications service provider (even AT&T provides access to the
Internet) to the one-man, one-computer bulletin board operator. In
laying a foundation for the CD.Ns defenses to liability, however,
Congress has confused the determination of the reach of the section.
First, Congress explained that one purpose of new section 230 of the
Communications Act is to overrule any case law which holds that an
online service provider incurs liability for exercising control of the
content available on its service.37 The purpose of the section was to
pave the way for a defense to liability under the CDA. Section (e)(S)
provides a defense to prosecution under the CDA for having taken
"reasonable, effective, and appropriate" measures to block access of a
prohibited communication to a minor child.
Defense provision (e)(l) makes available a wide escape hatch for
anyone "providing access to a facility, system, or network not under his
control." Section (e)(3), in what at first seems redundant, clarifies that
the defense is not available to a person who provides access to a system,
facility, or network that is under such person's control or ownership.
The suggestion seems to be that if a service operator owns or controls
a facility, system, or network, the operator knows or should know of
prohibited communications made by means of its systems.
The result of Congress's patchwork of sweeping liability and broad
defenses is a statute that does not know whether it is coming or going.
To suggest that ownership or control of a facility, system, or network
necessarily means knowledge of illegal actions by system users rises to
duplicitous involvement in prohibited communications is unfounded.

37. Explanatory Statement, infra note 105, at HI 130.
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For one thing, as discussed later in this section, it ignores one hundred
years of common carrier policy and regulation. Even a cursory review
of the sound reasons for exemption from liability for common carriers
would have revealed potential problems for the CDA.
In addition, "adjusting" the sweep of section 230 by devising a
patchwork of defenses is not responsible legislative drafting. Why not
pull back on the broad definition of interactive computer services rather
than limit liability through a series of defense provisions?
3.

Distinct Treatment of "Enhanced Services" and the Blurring
Lines Between Common and Private Carriage

Buried at the end of a section not directly relevant to the issue of
service provider control of content is the following sentence: "Nothing
in this section shall be construed to treat interactive computer services
as common carriers or telecommunications carriers."38
The commercial online services both provide access to proprietary
systems under their control, and provide access to the Internet, which,
of course, they do not control. Internet service providers provide
connections to the Internet only. It is unclear, however, whether the
ISPs are properly classified as common carriers, and thus not subject to
liability for content, or exercise enough control over their system's
content to be considered under subsection (d).
Indeed, the CDA's unelaborated use of the term "common carrier"
disregards a century of judicial and regulatory struggle over properly
distinguishing between common and private carriers. At least as far
back as 1889, the Supreme Court has said of the common carrier/private
carrier distinction:
A common carrier is such by virtue of his occupation, not by virtue of the
responsibilities under which he rests. . . • A common carrier may become a
private carrier ... when, as a matter of accommodation or special engaiement,
he undertakes to carry something which it is not his business to carry.

The Court thus suggested that a given carrier may operate as both a
common and private carrier. When it undertakes its regular business
activities, previously deemed common carrier services, it is subject to
common carrier regulation. When it contracts to perform activities
38.
39.

CDA, supra note 1, at § 502(e)(6).
Liverpool & G.S. Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397,440 (1889).
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outside the scope of its regular operations, activities are not deemed
common carriage, it is a private carrier for that particular transaction.40
More recently, regulators have determined that a carrier may serve as
both a common carrier and a private carrier depending upon the
characteristics of the telecommunications services provided. Specifically,
common carrier provision of "enhanced services" will in most cases
subject that carrier to distinct regulation as a noncommon carrier with
respect to the enhanced service. Moreover, because the FCC has found
that "complex communications technologies ... blur the line between
common and private carriage,',4 1 precise line-drawing between and
among telecommunications services continues to challenge regulators and
their reviewing courts.
In providing that interactive computer services are not common
carriers, Congress presumably meant to deny those services safe harbor
in traditional common carrier regulation. A service provider is a
common carrier and is thus not subject to liability for the content of its
transmissions when: (1) the carrier holds itself out as an indifferent
provider, and (2) the end-user of the service designs and chooses the
intelligence to be transmitted.42
In the 1976 NARUC II decision, the D.C. Circuit Court found that a
requirement that "has particular applicability to the communications field
is the . . . prerequisite to common carrier status . . . that the system be
such that customers transmit intelligence of their own design and
choosing.',43 In other words, when the users of communications
equipment or facilities control the content of their transmissions, the
carrier is deemed neutral and is not subject to any liability arising from
the contents of the communications.
Importantly, the NARUC II court seemed to adopt a broad view of the
behavior required by an end-user to meet the common carrier prerequisite of the "design[ing] and choosing of the intelligence to be transmitted, ... any two-way use of cable in which the customer explicitly or
implicitly determines the transmission or content of the return message,

40. Id.
41. Independent Data Communications Manufacturers Association Petition for
Declaratoiy Ruling re AT&T's InterSpan Frame Relay Service, l 0 FCC Red 13717,
13724. In addition, FCC rules impose common carrier status on Local Exchange
Carriers (LECs) as a condition of LEC provision of enhanced services over the LEC's
own network. Thus, a carrier that would otherwise be free from common carrier
regulation in the provision of enhanced services is subject to such regulation if it owns
the network over which the enhanced services are provided.
42. See NARUC v. FCC, 525 F.2d 630 (1976) ("NARUC I"); NARUC v. FCC,
533 F.2d 60, 610 (1976) ("NARUC II").
43. NARUC, 533 F.2d at 609.
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satisfies [the] second prerequisite to common carrier status.''44 The
court identified a burglar alarm system, ''whereby the customer intends
and expects a message to be sent at the occurrence of a particular event,
[as] an example of implicit customer control.',45 Indeed, the court
determined that content control "may arise solely from the determination
to transmit or not [to transmit].'>46 Thus, under the NARUC decisions,
an Internet service provider would almost certainly be characterized as
a common carrier. Indeed, ISP customers create the "intelligence" of
their transmissions; the ISPs merely transmit that intelligence unaltered.
It may be that in expressly removing interactive computer services
from common carrier status, Congress sought to ensure that the
classification would not be used to avoid liability under the CDA. It is
inappropriate, however, to remove interactive computer services as a
whole without addressing the distinctions between and among members
of that classification. Some members of the class may be more
characteristic of a common carrier, others may be less so.

C. Determination ofLiabili'ty Under the CDA
The Communications Decency Act modifies the Communications Act
of 1934 by amending section 223(a) to include the use of"telecommunications devices" rather than simply telephones. The updated legislation
reasonably seeks to prevent an escape from liability to those who
intentionally annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another individual by
means of non-telephone telecommunications devices. Such telecommunications devices used to violate the section could include fax machines,
pagers, and wireless communications devices. Because telecommunications device is left undefined in the CDA, however, it is difficult to
determine the range of devices within reach of the subsection.
The CDA also adds a new subsection (d) to section 223 of the original
Communications Act. Subsection (d) extends liability to anyone who
uses an interactive computer service to "make available" to a person
under the age of eighteen a communication that, in context, is patently
offensive. The subsection is distinct from subsection (a) in two ways:
(1) it refers to the use of interactive computer services, services that the

44.
45.

46.

Id. at 610 (emphasis added).
Id. at n.46.
Id. at 610.
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CDA advises are not telecommunications devices, and (2) knowledge
that the recipient of a prohibited message is under eighteen is not
required.
The three problems that arise in subsection (d) are: (1) determining
who is an interactive computer service, (2) adjudging "context," and (3)
applying the "contemporary community standards" to determine patent
offensiveness. The :first problem is discussed in detail later in this
section; the second and third problems are discussed in Part ID.

1.

Overview ofAffected Parties and Conduct Subject to Liability

Amended subsection (a)(l)(A) reaches anyone who uses a telecommunications device to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person
(''harasser''). Subsection (a)(l)(B) reaches the harasser who transmits an
obscene or indecent communication to another person whom the harasser
knows is under eighteen years old ("pedophile harasser''). Subsections
(a)(l)(C), (D), and (E) all reach the harasser who uses a telephone or
other telecommunications device to harass anonymously, or to cause a
telephone to ring repeatedly. Actual communication between the
harasser and his intended victim is not necessary (thereby including a
"crank caller").
These provisions update existing law by extending liability to the use
of telecommunications devices other than telephones. Because both
knowledge (of under-aged recipients) and intent to harass are required,
the provisions do not appear to reach significantly or unreasonably
beyond existing law.
As discussed below, because telecommunications device is not defined
in the CDA, point-to-multipoint communications such as e-mail and
bulletin board postings may be swept into the subsection. On the other
hand, because interactive computer services are expressly excluded from
the definition of telecommunications device, most point-to-multipoint
communications may be protected from these subsections.
Subsections (d)(l)(A) and (B) reach the computer user who makes
available to minor children communications deemed patently offensive
as determined by contemporary community standards. A person in
violation of these subsections is labeled under the CDA as a "computer
offender." Because subsection (d) does not require intent, the provision
potentially sweeps in anyone who contributes to a "public forum" in
cyberspace any material that may unintentionally find its way to a minor
child. Moreover, because "patent offensiveness" is to be determined by
"contemporary community standards," indistinct and/or meaningless
jurisdictional boundaries within the communities of cyberspace may lead
to the application of the most conservative standards to all cybercitizens.
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Subsections (a)(2) and (d)(2) reach anyone who permits his telecommunications facility to be used to violate the provisions of the CDA with
the intent that the facility be used for such activities (''passive offender").
Because telecommunications facility is not defined in the• CDA, the
passive offender potentially runs the gamut from the largest telecommunications infrastructure and service provider to a home-based computer
used to "host" a small cyber-community. Despite the non-acknowledgment of the distinction for liability purposes between private and
common telecommunications carriers, the intent requirement of the
subsection may be enough to shield the truly passive transmitter.

2.

Section (a)(l)(A)

As explained above, this section of the CDA updates the Communications Act of 1934 by replacing the word ''telephone" with the term
"telecommunications device." The intent of the section, to prohibit the
making of an "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent" communication with intent to "annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another person,"
remains the same. Although the CDA does not provide a complete
definition of ''telecommunications device," except to say that an
"interactive computer service" is not one, presumably Congress meant
to account for new types of personal communications devices such as
fax machines, pagers, and cellular phones that might be used as
effectively as a telephone to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass another
person.
Because the subsection prohibits the making and sending of obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent images or other communications,
however, the provision may reach significantly farther than it did under
the original Communications Act. No longer limited to the spoken voice
or other audible sounds, the subsection may reach a whole host of
communications including literary and artistic works and the content of
e-mail. Although many may decry the perhaps increased subjectivity of
determining the lasciviousness or lewdness of an image, the subsection
still requires intent to annoy, abuse, threaten, or harass. Because the
content of telephone conversations is, and always has been, subjective
as well, it may be that the intent requirement effectively limits the
potential over inclusiveness of the provision.
The subsection also refers to the "initiat[ion of] the transmission" of
a prohibited communication. Given Congress's clear intention elsewhere
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in the CDA to provide for vicarious liability for the transmission of
prohibited communications, the wording of this section may be of
concern for telecommunications service providers such as telephone
companies. However, transmission alone is not enough under this
subsection. One must make (or create or solicit) and transmit the
communication to be liable. Moreover, the wording provides that one
must knowingly make and transmit the communications. Thus,
"passive"'transm.itters of communications may be effectively excluded
from liability under the subsection (a)(l)(A).

3.

Section (a)(J)(B)

Subsection (a)(l)(B) differs from (a)(l)(A) in two ways: (1) when the
person who makes and sends a prohibited communication knows that the
intended recipient is under the age of eighteen, it is not necessary that
the sender have initiated the communication, and (2) there is no intent
requirement. Although the subsection does not provide an example, a
reasonable interpretation of the first difference evokes the image of a
minor child telephoning or otherwise contacting an individual who then
transmits a prohibited communication to the minor child.

4.

Constructing a Definition of "Interactive Computer Service"

In determining who is liable under the new subsection (d) of the CDA,
one must determine what qualifies as an "interactive computer service."
Subsection (e)(6) informs that an interactive computer service is not to
be construed as either a common carrier or telecommunications carrier.
Subsection (h)(l) informs that a "telecommunications device" does not
include an interactive computer service. From this, we know what an
interactive computer service is not.
A definition of interactive computer service is provided in new section
230(e)(2):
[A]ny infonnation service, system, or access software provider that provides or
enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such
systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.

Arguably, any information creator or provider discussed herein, other
than telecommunications infrastructure common carriers, could fit into
this definition.
We now know what interactive computer services are not and what
they might be. Section 502(e)(l) provides:
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No person shall be held to have violated subsection (a) or (d) solely for
providing access or connection to or from a facility, system, or network not
under that person's control, including transmission, downloading, intermediate
storage, access software, or other related capabilities that are incidental to
providing such access or connection that does not include the creation of the
content of the communication.

It seems, then, that regardless of what the definition of "interactive
computer services" may include, liability under the new law only reaches
those who truly have, and exercise, some editorial control over the
content to which they provide access.
Congress may or may not know that those providers currently
exercising editorial control over their content (e.g., AOL, CompuServe,
etc.) have long since implemented controls that would appear to fall
easily within the "good faith" defenses outlined in the Act.47 Perhaps
Congress is really only after individual content creators-those who
obtain or create "patently offensive" material and upload it to computer
servers accessible to minors.

5. Applications of Electronic Mail Mechanisms
Amended subsections 223(a)(l)(C), (D), and (E) simply retain the
provisions of section 223 of the original Communications Act by
prohibiting anonymous or harassing telephone calls or causing another's
telephone to ring repeatedly. As with the other subsections of amended
section 223, the word ''telephone" is replaced with the term "telecommunications device." Thus, one could deduce that the use of a fax machine
or pager to harass another would be reached by the Act. Again,
however, the undefined term ''telecommunications device" leaves precise
application of the subsection ambiguous.
Perhaps the most far-reaching application of subsections (C), (D), and
(E) would be to persons using electronic mail (e-mail) anonymously or
repeatedly with the intention of harassing the receiving party or parties.

47.

CompuServe has segregated adult-oriented content on its service to a separate

area that can only be accessed by password. Similarly, America Online has "parental
control" features that block adult-oriented material unless the subscriber affirmatively
alters the control settings. Michelle Healy, Ecstasy Alert, USA TODAY, July 30, 1997,
at ID.
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Because postings to news groups and electronic bulletin boards (BBS)48
employ e-mail mechanisms, the subsections may reach those who post
without intending to communicate with any particular person. The
potential liability for those who post to "open"49 groups or bulletin
boards is enormous: an e-mail directed to an unknown party may find
its way to the "egg shell plaintiff."50
Specifically, one posting a communication to a wide audience on a
bulletin board or an Internet newsgroup may find that what was intended
to be merely provocative is perceived by some as harassing. In this
way, the potential harasser may not be shielded by the intent requirement; after all, he intended to be provocative. Indeed, anyone who
participates in online communications understands that the "faceless"
nature of discussions can lead to misunderstood intentions that result in
awkward or embarrassing (or worse) encounters. On the other hand, the
CDA specifically excludes "interactive computer services" from the
definition of "telecommunication device." Speaking to this issue, the
CDA states that, "[t]he use of the term 'telecommunications device' in
this section ... does not include an interactive computer service."51
Thus, subsections (C), (D), and (E) may not apply at all to e-mail and
the communications made to BBS's and news groups. Without more
precise definitions of the terms used throughout the CDA, however,
liability for prohibited communications through the use of such
mechanisms cannot be determined.

48. See Ferdinand M. DeLeon, Electronic Bulletin Boards Offer Forums to Share
Interests, Friendship, SEATILE TiMEs, Mar. 12, 1995, at Cl.
49. There are several different types of virtual groups whose members communicate using computers. Usenet and Netnews groups, for example, are accessed via the
Internet and are available indiscriminately to anyone who has access to the Internet,
Groups on the commercial online services, on the other hand, are available only to the
subscribers to the particular service. Finally, dial-up bulletin boards reside on a single
"host'' computer and are accessed by individuals over phone lines by calling into the
host computer.
SO. See generally Aya V. Matsumoto, Reforming the Reform: Mental Stress Claims
Under California's Workers' Compensation System, 21 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1327 (1994);
J. Hou!t Verkerke, Notice Liability in Employment Discrimination Law, 81 VA. L. REV.
273 (1995); Gail D. Hollister, Using Comparative Fault to Replace the All-or-Nothing
Lottery Imposed in Intentional Torts Suits in Which Both Plaintiffand Defendant Are at
Fault, 46 VAND. L. Rl!v. 121 (1993).
51. CDA, supra note l, at§ 223(b)(l)(B).
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D.

I.

Defenses to Liability Included in the CDA

First Amendment Challenges to Statutory Defenses

Section 502(e)(5)(A) provides a defense for those providers who,
"ha[ve] taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate
actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent access by minors
to a communication specified [in the CDAJ ...." These measures may
include software designed to filter out objectionable material, training for
parents and children on "responsible use of computers," or requiring
access codes, passwords, or credit card numbers to access certain
materials.52 It is impossible to determine, however, which blocking
mechanisms would qualify under the CDA as "effective," if any.
Moreover, because of the rapid growth of online communications, the
evolution of the telecommunications technology it employs, and the
changing nature of its protocols, blocking mechanisms deemed
"effective" under the Act today may be obsolete tomorrow.
Subsection 223(e)(l) provides a defense for service providers who
provide access to materials not under their control. A spokesperson for
Senator Exon (the chief sponsor of the CDA) recently explained that this
defense would protect, for example, commercial online service provider
America Online for providing access to the World Wide Web that results
in a minor receiving prohibited materials.53 Although it may seem
reassuring that a spokesperson for one of the CDA's creators has
publicly expressed this view, it is by no means clear from the wording
of the Act that Congress intended to so severely limit the reach of the
CDA. America Online creates its own content, monitors activity on its

52. Section 230(c)(2)(A) provides:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on
account of . • • any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to
or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.
Many have interpreted this language to contemplate widely-available filtering or
screening software to block material from appearing on a user's computer monitor.
What Decision on Internet Decency Means, A'ILANTA J. & ATLANTA CONST., June 13,
1996, at E4.
53. See Statement ofChris McLean, FED. COMM. BAR AsS"N NEWSL., Mar. 1996,
at 20••
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service, provides access to the Internet, and owns much of the telecommunications and computer infrastructure it employs. If a commercial
online service provider such as this is immune from liability under the
CDA, it is difficult to imagine who Congress seeks to reach in the first
place. Indeed, if the intent of the CDA is to reach only the demented
pedophile, sitting at home in front of his computer devising ways to
offend intended victims, it is difficult to understand the sweeping nature
of the legislation.

2. Limits on Defenses Provided by the CDA
Subsection (e)(3) of section 502 provides that the defenses to liability
under the CDA shall not apply "to a person who provides access or
connection to a facility, system, or network engaged in a violation of this
section that is owned or controlled by such person." The wording of
this defense provision begs two questions: (1) the persistent and
unanswered question of how a "facility'' is defined under the CDA, and
(2) the problematic determination, addressed above, of what it means to
control a "facility, system, or network."
The limitations on defenses to liability provided in subsection {e)(3)
are of limited reach, however, because they apply only to the defenses
provided in paragraph (1) of subsection (e)(l). The defense to liability
provided in paragraph (5) of subsection (e) of the CDA applies broadly
to all liability imposed under amended section 223(a) and new section
223(d).
The CDA also provides that the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) may develop an advisory list to aid content creators and access
providers in avoiding liability under the new law. 54 Nothing in the Act
suggests that compliance with the FCC's suggestions provides a legal
defense or "safe harbor"55 from liability.

3. Adequacy of CDA Defenses
The question of whether service providers control their content is even
more problematic for Internet service providers. Many view ISPs as
mere "onramps" to the Internet-completely neutral common carriers
neither exercising editorial control over the content provided through
their facilities nor having knowledge of their potential liability.

54. CDA, supra note I, at§ 502(e)(6).
55. See Richard C. Turkington, Safe Harbors and Stem Warnings: FCC Regulation
ofIndecent Broadcasting, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. LJ. I, 2 (1996).
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On the other hand, one might argue that because the servers to which
ISPs' customers connect are really something more than a data conduit,
the providers should be held to a higher standard than, for example, a
telecommunications backbone provider.56 Indeed, Internet content is
stored in an ISP's server, however temporarily, and there is evidence that
the ISP could, if it so chose, filter out certain "locations" on the
Intemet. 57
The ambiguities of the "control" issue aside, subsection (e)(l) of
section 502 seems to provide a defense for an ISP regardless of how it
is conceptualized: ''No person shall be held to have violated [the
CDA] ... for providing access ..• including transmission, downloading,
intermediate storage, access software, or other related capabilities...."
The wording of this defense provision would seem to cover all the
activities of even the most attentive ISP. Indeed, even some BBS's and
"moderated"58 newsgroups may find shelter under this broad defense
since most such systems are capable of fully automated operation.

4.

Determination ofLiability for Parties
Attempting to Control Content

Section 509 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, familiarly titled
the "Online Family Empowerment Act," reflects Congress's intent to
overrule a New York Supreme Court case59 characterizing an online
service provider as a publisher by virtue of the provider exercising
control over the content of its service. The Stratton court found that
"with . . . editorial control comes increased liability.',6° Because
Prodigy had "held itself out to the public and its members as controlling

56. A "backbone" is a high-speed, high-capacity telecommunications line to which
thousands of separate telephone lines are connected. The backbone is capable of
transmitting many conversations or data streams simultaneously.
57. See Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Serv., 907
F. Supp. 1361, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The Netcom system operators in that case
admitted that it was possible for them to take affirmative steps to "screen out'' specified
Internet content
58. Many electronic bulletin boards are moderated, often by volunteers.
Moderators perform administrative functions of the group, including screening the
content of posted messages for materials deemed inappropriate for the subject of the
discussion or pwpose of the board.
59. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Serv. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup.
1995) (not approved by Reporter of Decisions for reporting in state reports).
60. Id. at *3.
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the content of its computer bulletin boards," the service could not now
deny liability under a publisher paradigm.61
Although the Stratton case addressed a copyright issue,62 it was the
court's imposition of liability on the service provider by virtue of its
content control that Congress sought to undermine with the inclusion of
section 509 of the Act. Because the Telecommunications Act is not
meant to address copyright issues, even in the new context of
cyberspace, it is reasonable to infer that Congress sought to ensure that
online service providers would not be subject to liability under the CDA
for exercising, or attempting to exercise, control over information
content. Had Congress not overruled Stratton, the defenses provided in
the CDA would be undermined or, at least, would be ineffectual and
difficult to apply.
Yet, in this respect, Congress seems to want to have it both ways. A
narrow reading of the CDA would suggest that liability falls only to
those content creators who proactively offend an intended target (or
inadvertently offend a minor). A more broad though equally reasonable
reading of the Act, however, suggests that any person or entity who is
in any way involved with the creation, transmission, or delivery of an
offending communication could be liable. In other words, Congress's
overruling of Stratton implies that the CDA seeks to reach only the
creators of offending communications, not passive transmitters; yet, the
definition of interactive computer service as provided in section
230(e)(2) of the CDA includes, "information ... systems ... including
specifically ... system[s] ... provid[ing] access to the Internet." This
wording suggests that Congress seeks to impose liability not only on
content creators but on those who deliver the message as well.63
·on the other hand, the Explanatory Statement accompanying the CDA
claims that, "the conferees intend that [the defense allowed by overruling
Stratton] be construed broadly to avoid impairing the growth of online

61. Id. at *4.
62. Id. at *4-*6 (holding that Prodigy was a publisher of statements concerning
plaintiffs on its "Money Talks" computer bulletin board, and tbat moderator, or "board
leader" of "Money Talks" BBS acted as agent of Prodigy).
63. Despite the over inclusive wording of § 230(f), tbe Explanatory Statement
accompanying the CDA claims: "Internet operators who provide access to the Internet
and other interactive computer services shall not be liable for indecent material accessed
by means of their services." Explanatory Statement, infra note 105, at Hl 129, This
statement claims that any interactive computer service, from AOL to the Internet service
providers, are not liable absent actual knowledge of and subsequent conspiracy to
facilitate prohibited communications. If the CDA itself had been this clear, significantly
fewer telecommunications and computer service providers would be in fear of the reach
of the law.
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communications through a regime of vicarious liability."64 The mistake
that Congress made-to the detriment of a myriad of telecommunications
service providers--was to not express this goal in the wording
of the CDA.
ill.

CONGRESSIONAL, JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DISTINCTIONS
BETWEEN "INDECENCY" AND "OBSCENITY"

In addition to the ambiguities and contradictions with regard to
computers, networks, and the instrumentalities of telecommunications,
the CDA attempts to create and apply standards for use in determining
liability under the Act. While the vague definition of terms such as
"telecommunications device" makes precise application of the CDA
difficult and confusing, it is the statute's imposition of ill-conceived and
overbroad standards that poses the greatest threat to the already large and
fast-growing cyberspace community.
Congress's proximate use of the terms "obscenity" and "indecency''
reflects a disingenuous suggestion that the words are synonymous. In
outlawing the dissemination of "obscene or indecent'' materials,
Congress ignores a century of line-drawing between the terms and an
evolution of their perceived meanings. Ironically, Congress has
reassembled the essence of a sentence from a nineteenth-century law that
regulators and the courts have spent one-hundred years deconstructing.

A.

The Comstock Laws

Near the end of the Civil War, the U.S. Postmaster General reported
that "great numbers" of "dirty'' pictures and books were being mailed to
troops in the :field.65 Congress reacted by passing a law making it a
crime to send any "obscene book, pamphlet, picture, print, or other
publication of vulgar and indecent character'' through the U.S. mail.66
Within a decade, Anthony Comstock, secretary of the New York
Society for the Suppression of Vice, had successfully promoted an

64. Explanatory Statement, infra note 105, at Hl 129.
65. Robert Com-Revere, New Age Comstockery: Exon vs. the Internet, Cato Policy
Analysis No. 232, June 28, 1995 (visited Sept. 11, 1997)
<http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-232.html>.
66. Post Office Act, chap. 89, sec. 16, 13 Stat 504, 507 (1865).
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expanded version of the Postal Act.67 The new law was popularly
named the "Comstock Law." 63 In addition to the prohibition against
using the U.S. mails to send obscene, vulgar, or indecent material, the
new law made it a crime to distribute lewd or lascivious publications or
pictures. 69
Then, as now, the laws against obscenity, indecency, or other
publications potentially offensive to some, centered around the perceived
need to protect children. The laws responding to the movement led by
Comstock were modeled after an opinion written in a contemporary
English case, Regina v. Hicklin,70 which held that the test for obscenity
turned on whether the material tended to corrupt the morals of a young
or immature mind. 71
The English court was concerned with the young or immature "into
whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."72 Neither the intended
audience nor the "overall artistic merit'' of the material in question were
important in determining the government's right to regulate distribution.73
Despite the Constitution's First Amendment, literary artists and the
particular tastes of mature adults faired little better in the United States
during Comstock's crusade. The Victorian age's preoccupation with
preserving the ''virtue" of young women was only one motivating force
behind Comstock's success. He also crusaded against "dime novels"
with tales of wild west gunslingers and big-city crime. Comstock and
his followers in Congress denounced such materials as "the inspiration
for all of the antisocial behavior exhibited by the youth of today."74

67. Among Comstock's methods was the setting up in the Vice President's Office
of what became known as "The Chamber of Horrors,'' for the pwpose of displaying
materials that Comstock believed should not be available to the public, Com-Revere,
supra note 65, at 2, 3.
68. An Act for the Suppression of, Trade in, and Circulation of, Obscene Literature
and Articles of Immoral Use, chap. 258, sec. 2, 17 Stat. 598, 599 {1873).
69. See generally Jonathon Rosenoer, Indecent Communication (visited Sept. 9,
1997) <http://www.cyberlaw.com/cylwl295.html> (discussing specific examples of
"Comstock Law'' violations); Daniel L. Appelman, Policing the 'Net's Red Light
District, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at Cl (discussing the strict application of the
obscenity standards when applying the CDA).
70. Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. 360 (1868).
71. Com-Revere, supra note 65, at 2.
72. See Regina, 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 371.
73. Id. Some English judges found that literary merit compounded the danger of
obscene materials reaching the vulnerable by virtue of their being "disguised" in a
generally acceptable publication. Com-Revere, supra note 65, at 2 (discussing the work
of EDWARD DE GRAZIA, GIRLS LEAN BACK EVERY\VHERE 12 (Random House 1992)).
74. Blanchard, supra note 7, at 757. A more modem version of the concern over
non-sexually-related materials and their effect on young or immature minds was the 1954
congressional hearings about comic books: a child psychologist named Frederic Wertham
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Comstock's activities, and those of John Sumner, who carried on the
effort after Comstock's death, resulted in the destruction of hundreds of
thousands of publications ranging from the work of early feminists
(because references to abortion or birth control were often contained
therein)75 to D.H. Lawrence76 to George Bernard Shaw.77
The tide began to tum in 1932 when the newly formed Random House
Publishing Company decided to publish James Joyce's banned Ulysses.
When copies of Joyce's book were seized by customs officials, Random
House sued in Federal court. The District Court's ruling and its
affirmation on appeal created the standard that such publications must
be considered in their whole.78 If a publication has artistic or literary
merit when taken as a whole, it cannot be banned outright based on such
isolated passages as may be offensive to some.
The James Joyce case marked the end of the Rule of Hicklin that had
been the basis of the Comstock Laws. The yardstick for the measure of
obscenity would no longer be the sensitivities of the most vulnerable
victim but rather the average person. The ground was now laid for the
evolution of a new "indecency'' standard as the Supreme Court reviewed
government action in the broadcast medium.

B.

Speech of "Minimal Value"

As early as 1957, the Supreme Court, in Roth v. United States,19
found that "[a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance---unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the
prevailing climate of opinion----have the full protection of the [First
Amendment] guaranties."80 Because the Court has consistently held

wrote a book in which he claimed that comic books were a leading cause of juvenile
delinquency. Al; a result of those hearings, comic books were sanitized. Bob Gale,
Fans of Sex and Violence Will Love the V-Chip, WAll ST. J., Feb. 21, 1996, at Al4.
75. See generally Mary Becker, Conservative Free Speech and the Uneasy Case
for Judicial Review, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 975, 1006 (1993).
76. All copies of Lawrence's Women in Love were recalled and destroyed and the
printing plates melted down.
77. Comstock attacked Shaw's play Mrs. Warren's Profession because it dealt with
prostitution. In response, Shaw coined the tenn "Comstockery" in his own effort to
combat overzealous moralizing.
78. See United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses by James Joyce, 72 F.2d 705,
708 (2d Cir. 1934).
79. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
80. Id. at 484.
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that obscene speech is not protected by the First Amendment, any
communication adjudged obscene necessarily must be devoid of "even
minimal value."
Sixteen years later, in Miller v. Califomia,81 the Court put into words
the essence of the James Joyce case decided by a U.S. Court of Appeals
in 1934, "[Obscenity] must ... be limited to works which, taken as a
whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual
conduct in a patently offensive way, and which ... do not have serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 82 The Court's finding
did at least two things: (1) it limited obscene materials or communications to those of a sexual nature, and (2) it provided four broad
categories under which the requisite minimal social value may be found
to justify the dissemination of otherwise obscene speech.
When the Miller Court returned to the states and local communities
the power to evaluate and suppress obscene speech, it may have been as
much a matter of practicality as a precise reading of the dictates of the
Constitution. In the decade and a half between Roth and Miller, the
Court had become the final arbiter of obscenity determinations thirty-one
times. The Justices may have tired of reviewing' speech which many of
them undoubtedly found personally offensive, and admittedly were
beginning to conclude that an opinion from an unreviewable, national
court was not serving justice or the people effectively. Indeed, Justice
Brennan eventually concluded that the government could not constitutionally prohibit obscene speech at all.83

IY. 'TWISTING IN THE WIND-THE FCC'S "INDECENCY STANDARD"
The authors of the CDA suggest that the rationale permitting the
regulation of obscenity and indecency in the broadcast medium should
apply to communications in cyberspace. Indeed, the Explanatory
Statement accompanying the CDA cites Supreme Court case law
addressing broadcast regulation to support this proposition. In addition,
the CDA invites the FCC to develop guidelines for those seeking to
avoid liability under the Act. Thus, a review of the FCC's regulation of
broadcast obscenity and indecency is important to understanding
Congress's intentions with respect to the CDA.

81.

413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Id. at 24.
83. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 113 (1973) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).

82.
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A. Development of the Indecency Standard
For the regµlation of broadcast indecency and obscenity, the FCC first
looks outside of the Act under which it is authorized to regulate the
airwaves in the public interest.84 Criminal Statute 18 U.S.C. § 1464
reads: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both."85 Although only the
Justice Department can bring criminal actions under the statute (and it
rarely does so), the FCC may, under its authorizing statute, impose civil
penalties on broadcasters who violate section 1464.86
In addition, under sections 312 and 503 of the Communications Act
of 1934, the FCC may: (1) revoke the station's broadcast license for a
section 1464 violation, (2) issue cease and desist orders, and (3) impose
fines against violators. 87 Under sections 307 and 308, the FCC may
deny renewal, renew on a temporary basis, or deny a broadcast license
application for activities it deems violative of the law. Finally, under
section 303(g), the FCC can use the broad power of its mandate to
"promote the larger and more effective use of radio in the public
interest."88

B.

Reshaping the Standard After Miller v. California

In response to Miller v. Califomia,89 the FCC released an order
purportedly recasting its indecency standard in harmony with the rule of
that case. The FCC found that:
the concept of 'indecent' is intimately connected with the exposure of children
to language that describes, in tenns patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or

84. The Communications Act of 1934 authorized the FCC to regulate the airwaves.
See Paul J. Feldman, The FCC and Regulation of Broadcast Indecency: Is There a
National Broadcast Standard in the Audience?, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 369, 371 (1989).
85. 18 u.s.c. § 1464 (1994).
86. See Feldman, supra note 84, at 372.
87. Id. at 372.
.
88. Id. at 373; But see Pacifica v. FCC, 438 U.S. 726, 778 (Stewart, J., dissenting)(finding that FCC does not have authority to regulate indecency independent of
§ 1464).
89. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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excretory activities and organs, at limes o.fo the day when there is a reasonable
risk that children will be in the audience.

Believing it was justified as the authorized regulator of the airwaves,
the FCC reformulated the indecency standard it found in Miller to apply
to the broadcast medium. The important factors noted by the FCC were:
(1) unsupervised children have access to radio;

(2) radio receivers are in the home, where people's privacy interest is entitled

to greater deference;
(3) unconsenting adults may tune into a station without heeding any warning
about offensive language; and
(4) spectrum scarcity justifies greater regulation of broadcasting than other
modes of communication.91

In addition, the FCC excused itself from two of the three prongs of the

Miller test by making the questionable assertion that, for purposes of
section 1464, the term "indecency'' is not subsumed by the term
"obscene." Thus, the FCC was not limited under the section to the
regulation of material that "appealed to prurient interests." The FCC
also boldly declared that "when children are in the audience, [words
deemed indecent] cannot be redeemed by their literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value."92

C.

Contemporary Community Standards for the Broadcast Medium

The Miller Court also developed the "contemporary community
standards" language first introduced in Roth. The social values of the
locality in which the speech or communication in question is found are
to be applied in determining whether such speech or communication is
obscene.93 Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote: "[the First Amendment
does not require] that the people of Maine and Mississippi accept public
depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas or New York
City."94
In reworking its indecency standard after Miller, the FCC tagged on
the words "in the broadcast medium" to the phrase "contemporary
community standards." Thus, the Commission suggested that communi-

90. Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent, and Obscene Material, 51 FCC
2d 418, 425, Feb. 19, 1975 (emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. The FCC's order did, however, allow that the artistic, literary, political, or
scientific value of indecent speech broadcast during "late hours" would be evaluated in
considering sanctions.
93. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 32.
94. Id. See also Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987) (holding that only obscenity
is to be adjudged by local standards; artistic merit, etc., is reviewed under "reasonable
man" theory).
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ty standards are determined differently with respect to broadcast.
Indeed, the implication was that the concept of "community'' may be
distinct in the broadcast paradigm..
·
The FCC did not define the "contemporary community standards for
the broadcast medium." Thus, the issue of whether the rationale of
Miller properly applies within a differently conceived form of "community'' was left unexplored. Indeed, the community of the broadcast
medium may differ in many ways. First, the geographic character of the
community may vary dramatically depending upon nothing more than
the power (reach) of a broadcast signal. Second, the demographic
makeup of the community may include individuals or groups who would
normally not be "connected" by the comm.on receipt of broadcast
entertainment or information. Finally, the common understanding and
experience of a "comm.unity'' may be entirely inapplicable to the
broadcast paradigm. The "community'' discussed in Miller arguably
assumed interaction between and among the members of that community; the nature of broadcast, simultaneous communication from one
"speaker" to many listeners, precludes interaction.

D. Hamling and the Creation of a National Standard
In 1974, the Supreme Court sought to abridge the use of its "contemporary community standards" test to judge speech on the basis of a
decision maker's personal opinion or by its effect on a particularly
sensitive person or group.95 The Court noted that by referring to the
comm.unity standard in Miller, it did not require the use of any precise
geographical area in evaluating obscenity.96
In Hamling v. United States, the FCC saw an opportunity to justify the
national standard that it had alluded to earlier by referring to a community standard for the broadcast medium. In deciding that indecency would
be determined by the FCC based on the "average listener," the agency
was effectively admitting that a uniform standard would be applied.
Although it did not preclude the possibility that the average listener
would be determined on, for example, a state-by-state basis, no
methodology was put in place for such review. Moreover, any argument
that five commissioners sitting in Washington, D.C. could fairly apply

95.
96.

Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 107 (1974).
Id. at 103-10.
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differing standards depending upon the locale of the broadcast speech in
question was untenable.

E.

The English Rule

The FCC applied its new indecency standard against the Pacifica
Foundation for broadcasting what it deemed to be an indecent comedy
monologue.97 When the D.C. Circuit court reversed the FCC's
decision, the case went to the Supreme Court.98 The Court, while not
explicitly ruling on the validity of the FCC's indecency standard,
reversed the lower court's decision and affirmed and acknowledged the
FCC's criteria by which it distinguished broadcast from other media and
set it apart for more stringent regulation.99
Despite the high Court's sanctioning of the FCC's methods and
reasoning, it was several years before the FCC began to impose penalties
under its indecency standard. Because the Pacifica case had been
limited to a review of the particular speech at issue and the FCC's
finding it indecent, the agency sought to clarify that it would not be
limited to its prohibition of the particular words deemed indecent in that
case. In attempting to cast its indecency net as widely as possible, the
FCC provided that station licensees who broadcast indecent speech are
only protected "when there is not a reasonable risk that children may be
present in the broadcast audience."100
V.

THE INDECENCY STANDARD IN

A.

nm CDA

Regulation in the Broadcast Medium

Amended section 223(a) of the Communications Act prohibits the
knowing, intentional transmission of "obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
or indecent" communications. "Lewd, lascivious, and filthy'' are terms
neither defined by the CDA nor individually discussed in case law or
FCC proceedings. 101 "Obscene" and "indecent," on the other hand, are

97. FCC v. Pacifica, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977); rev'd, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
98. See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
99. Id. at 734-41, 748-50, 761-62.
100. See In the Matter of Pacifica Foundation Memorandum and Order, 2 FCC
REC. 2698, 2700 (1987).
101. The Court in Pacifica noted that Justice Harlan had limited the phrase,
"obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile" to cover only that which was
obscene. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740 (citing In Manual Enter., Inc; v. Day, 370 U.S. 478,
483 (1962)). The Pacifica Court went on to note that Justice Harlan's interpretation
resurfaced in Hamling, again limiting the application of the statutory language at issue
to that which was merely "obscene." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740.
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terms specifically discussed in Supreme Court case law and FCC
rulemakings.
A defining theme in the use of these terms by the government as
standards in broadcast regulation and the review of that regulation btf2
courts has been the distinction between obscene and indecent. 1 2
When broadcast over the airwaves, obscene communications may be
regulated by the FCC and are accorded no First Amendment protection
of free speech. Indecent communications, on the other hand, are
accorded some First Amendment protection, but may be regulated in the
broadcast medium.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the reasoning of Congress that
because the broadcast radio spectrum has long been considered a public
resource of limited quantity, the government may regulate its use in the
"public interest."103 In Pacifica v. FCC, the Court verified that the
FCC may impose sanctions for the broadcast of material deemed obscene
and that "indecent'' material may be restricted in ways tailored to prevent
it from reaching children and others who may be offended by it. 104

B. Distinction Between Broadcast and Interactive
Networked Communications
In an explanatory statement accompanying the CDA, 105 the conferees
charged with drafting the final version of the Telecommunications Bill
reported their intention that the term "indecenct' was to have the same
meaning as established in the Pacifica case. 10 While acknowledging
102. In discussing a statute at issue in the Pacifica case, the Court found that "[t]he
words 'obscene, indecent, or profane' are written in the disjunctive, implying that each
had a separate meaning. Prurient appeal is an element of the obscene, but the normal
definition of 'indecent' merely refers to nonconformance with accepted standards of
morality." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 739-40.
103. The Communications Act of 1934 provided that the Federal Communications
Commission was established to regulate the radio spectrum for the good of the public.
The Act was preceded by the Radio Act of 1926 which regulated the increasingly
crowded radio airwaves at the request of radio station operators who were frustrated with
signal interference problems.
I 04. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-50.
I 05. See Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 104-458 (1996), 142 Cong. Rec. H1078-03, H1107 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996),
for the Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995, Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) [hereinafter
"Explanatory Statement''].
I 06. Id. at HI 129
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that "[t]he precise contours of the definition of indecency have varied
slightly depending on the communications medium to which it has been
applied," the conferees insist that the essence of the phrase-patently
offensive descriptions of sexual or excretory activities-has remained
constant. 107
Despite pending challenges to federal indecency standards, the
conferees concluded that the question of whether indecency is overly
broad is not "seriously at issue."108 From there, the conferees confidently conclude that "[t]here is little doubt that indecency can be applied
to computer-mediated communications consistent with constitutional
strictures" 109 in as much as the standard has "already been applied
without rejection in other media contexts, including telephone, cable
(television), and broadcast radio." 110
Notwithstanding their false assertion that the Pacifica case actually
created or sanctioned a so-called "indecency standard," the conferees'
bigger problem is that they completely ignore the Court's reliance on the
unique characteristics of the broadcast medium. To suggest, as the
conferees do, that ''there is little doubt'' that the prohibition of indecent
material can be applied to cyberspace "consistent with constitutional
strictures" is to ignore the Court's own words justifying the
government's regulation of protected indecent speech in addition to
unprotected obscene speech over the airwaves:
Of all the forms of communication, broadcasting has the most limited First
Amendment protection. Among the reasons for specially treating indecent
broadcasting is the uniquely pervasive presence that medium of expression
occupies in the lives of our people. Broadcasts extend into the privacy of the
home and it is impossible completely to avoid those that are patently
offensive. 111

In a one-sentence parenthetical explanation of the Pacifica case, the
conferees reduce the Court's accordation of First Amendment rights to
indecent expression to a slovenly, inconsequential right the loss of which
we needn't lose sleep over: "describing indecency as low value and
marginally protected by the First Amendment."112 Thus, say the

107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. See generally Debra D. Burke, Cybersmut and the First Amendment: A
Cal/for a New Obscenity Standard, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 87, I I 8 {1996) (showing that
the regulation of broadcast media content has suffered little resistence from the
legislature or the courts).
111. FCC v Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 727 (1978).
112. Explanatory Statement, supra note 105, at HI 129
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conferees, given the "solid constitutional pedigree"113 of the indecency
standard, its application to cyberspace "poses no significant risk to the
free-wheeling and vibrant nature of discourse" 114 found on the Internet.
The drafters of the CDA either completely misunderstood the true
nature of the Internet and other elements of cyberspace, or are
disingenuously attempting to foist the regulatory justifications of a
distinct paradigm onto a new medium. It is difficult to decide which is
worse. Neither the Internet nor the commercial online services nor any
other member of cyberspace is a broadcaster.
Broadcasters cast their net broadly, and indiscriminately, over the
"free" public airwaves. 115 All within the range of the broadcaster's
signal who possess receiving equipment may perceive the signal, and all
receive the same information or entertainment content. In addition,
unlike "interactive computer services," receivers of broadcast signals are
unable to respond or in any way interact with the originator of broadcast
programming.
In contrast, connection to the Internet, through an Internet service
provider, is more analogous to the perception of a dial tone on a
telephone set. The telephone system's dial tone is a neutral conduit
facilitating access between a communicator and the listener of information of his choice. All connections to "locations" in cyberspace are
proactively initiated by users of networking equipment.
The conferees claim that "prohibiting indecency merely focuses
speakers to re-cast their message into less offensive terms." 116 This
over-simplified observation disregards Supreme Court law that acknowledges that some material which might be deemed indecent by some, may
have serious artistic merit or social value in other contexts. The
conferees claim that because section 502(d)(l)(B) of the CDA prohibits
communications which are, "in context," patently offensive, all otherwise
indecent materials are exempt from liability under the CDA if they are
113.
114.
115.
because

Id.
Id.
Broadcast television and radio is said to be "free" to the consuming public
it is funded by advertising revenues. See Kathryn Seagle Robbie, Turner

Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC: The Supreme Court Establishes a Standard ofReview
for First Amendment Issues Involving Cable Litigation, 1 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 375, 380
(1995); Toni Elizabeth Gilbert, Economic Regulation of the Cable Television Industry:
Reigning in a Giant at the Expense of the First Amendment, 45 CATIJ. U. L. REV. 615,
651 (1996).
116. Explanatory Statement, supra note 105, at HI 129.
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somehow adjudged valuable in an acceptable context. In adopting the
Supreme Court's intention that the meaning of the term "patently
offensive" should be determined by "contemporary community
standards," however, Congress has once again either revealed its
misunderstanding, or, at least, an under-appreciation, for the nature of
the growing cyberspace community.
Alternatively, and worse, Congress may intend to create and apply a
"national standard" to be applied to all "American"117 cyberspace. As
many fear, the standard to be applied could gravitate towards the "lowest
common denominator," or most conservative community standard found
in the service area of the Internet. Because all wide area computer
networks, including the Internet, employ the national telephone
infrastructure, there is virtually no physical or geographical limitation on
the affected community.

C. Lost Opportunities to Avoid Vagueness and Overbreadth
Congress considered and rejected an alternative standard for the CDA.
The proponents of the "harmful to minors" standard contended that, by
expressly tying the standard to the well-being of children under eighteen,
a "built-in" exception for material with serious literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value would have inhered in the CDA. The rejected
standard would have contemplated the reasoning of the Supreme Court
in Miller and related cases.
Ironically, in the Explanatory Statement accompanying the CDA, the
conferees of the final version of the Act assert that the proponents of the
harmful to minors standard "misapprehend the indecency standard itself."
In fact, it is Congress that completely misapprehends the indecency
standard. Indeed, the so-called indecency standard finds support only to
the extent that it applies to the broadcast medium.
Congress is well aware, or should be, that what it refers to as the
indecency standard was an invention of the FCC to be applied to overthe-air broadcast radio and television. When the Supreme Court upheld

117. The traditional concept of jurisdiction is an issue in cyberspace law and
scholarship. Because the new communities fonning in cyberspace are said to be
"virtual," i.e., they do not exist in geographical time and space, the jurisdiction, or the
reach of the law, to which cyber-communities are to be subject is far from clear. At
particular issue is domestic vs. international legal jurisdiction. Some have argued that
a paradigm such as that used for the law of the sea should be developed. See Timothy
S. Wu, Cyberspace Sovereignty-The Internet and the Intemationa/ System, IO HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 647, 660 (1997) (discussing a French proposal for a charter for
international cooperation on the Internet and the French government's "expressed hope
that the initiative would lead to an accord comparable to the international law of the
sea").
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the FCC's application of its standard in Pacifica, the basis of the
decision was unequivocal: it was the unique nature of the broadcast
medium that justified the limited infringement of otherwise constitutionally protected speech. Congress apparently believes that indecency as
a standard is malleable and may be applied to other mediums at will.

D.

Defiance to the CDA

On February 7, 1996 the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and
other groups announced their intent to file suit to challenge the
constitutionality of the CDA. 118 The CDA itself provided for an
expedited judicial review of the much-anticipated constitutional
challenges.11 9 The first challenge, filed in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, resulted in a limited
Temporary Restraining Order (1RO) of one part of the CDA.120
The voices of reason made three main arguments against the CDA.
First, notwithstanding those libertarians of cyberspace who view the First
Amendment as an unqualified dictate, the challengers acknowledge that
some speech is unprotected. Indeed, obscene speech is already outlawed
in cyberspace. 121 Rather, the challengers simply reminded the court
that indecent speech is protected by the First Amendment and if it is to
be regulated in cyberspace, a justification must be articulated similar to
that articulated for broadcast. In order for the CDA to have been
upheld, Congress would needed to have articulated a new justification
for the regulation of indecent speech; the broadcast paradigm simply
does not apply. Neither the scarcity of spectrum nor the pervasiveness
of over-the-air "free" television and radio applies to cyberspace.

118. See ACLU v. Reno, No. CN.A 96-963, 1996 WL 65464, at *1 (E.D. Pa Feb.
15, 1996).
119. CDA, supra note 1, at § 561.
120. The Temporary Restraining Order issued under ACLU v. Reno, stated: ''The
defendant [the Justice Dept] . • . [is] hereby enjoined from enforcing against plaintiffs
the provisions of 47 U.S.C. § 223 (a)(l)(B)(ii), insofar as [it] extend[s] to 'indecent,' but
not 'obscene."' ACLU v. Reno, No. CN.A 96-963, 1996 WL 65464, at *4.
121. See 142 Cong. Rec. S. 687, 694 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Leahy) ("We already have crimes on the books that apply to the Internet, by banning
obscenity, child pornography, and threats from being distributed over computers. In fact,
just before Christmas [1995], the President signed a new law we passed last year sh111ply
increasing penalties for child pornography and sexual exploitation crimes.").
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Second, the challengers criticized Congress's claim that its misapplied
indecency standard was narrowly tailored because suspect communications are to be reviewed "in context" for the depiction or description, in
terms patently offensive, of sexual or excretory activities or organs.
Supporters of the CDA argued that this "definition" of indecency would
limit liability under the Act to communications more-or-less equated
with pornography.
What the challengers hoped to show, however, was that Congress's
biggest mistake was its wholesale incorporation of the FCC's definition
of indecency. It is well known that the FCC has regulated speech under
its indecency standard that amounts to no more than the audio broadcast
of four-letter words. To impose the restrictions on broadcast imposed
by the FCC and upheld by the Supreme Court on cyberspace is to
infringe upon free speech to a far greater extent than Congress claimed
as its intention.
Third, the challengers suggested that the penalties imposed by the
CDA were far too severe to withstand the least restrictive means test of
First Amendment review. Restrictions on some speech are justified and
desirable in an ordered society. But to face a $250,000 fine and two
years in prison for making a communication that some would find
indecent almost implicates another constitutional standard: the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
The efforts of the ACLU and other groups opposed to the CDA were
rewarded. On June 26, 1997, the Supreme Court struck down those
portions of the CDA that would have exposed Internet and other online
service users to criminal and civil liability for "displaying" or "making
available to minors" material deemed indecent. 122
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Communications Decency Act is filled with undefined terms and
contradictory statements. Given the robust opposition to the Act and the
rush to include it within the larger Telecommunications Act of 1996, it
is not surprising that the myriad of last-minute compromises led to
poorly drafted legislation. And the muddled wording has led to much
confusion and possibly-unwarranted concerns. In order to calm the fears
of those who believe the CDA is over-reaching and to aid those who
would be charged with implementing it, Congress must make itself clear.
In attempting to incorporate into the Act standards for regulating the
content of cyberspace, Congress has disregarded the Supreme Court's
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treatment of obscenity and the development of the indecency/obscenity
distinction. In addition, Congress has misunderstood the FCC's
Indecency Standard and has disingenuously rationalized its application
to cyberspace and the new type of community that exists and thrives
there. By including the controversial "contemporary community
standards" measure, Congress has revealed its misconception of how
online communities are formed and the way in which their members
interact.
Congress has dismissed the Supreme Court's well-articulated reasons
for extending less First Amendment protection to indecency in the
broadcast medium. The justifications that inhere in the broadcast
paradigm, that the radio spectrum is a limited public resource and that
broadcast communications are pervasive, simply do not exist in
cyberspace. Congress asserts that the CDA's defense provisions ensure
that the law is narrowly tailored and thus is fortified against First
Amendment attack. This shows a remarkable misinterpretation of two
centuries of First Amendment analysis.
Moreover, even if the defense provisions of the CDA limit its
application, Congress has still discounted the non-legislative approaches
to addressing its interest in protecting the sensibilities of children.
Ironically, in attempting to shield from liability those who make "good
faith" efforts to inhibit prohibited communications, the CDA itself
mentions the ''blocking" software and other mechanisms that could be
used to satisfy the goals of the Act. It is as if Congress is saying: "This
law seeks to outlaw certain undesirable activity in cyberspace; and, by
the way, here's a better way to address the problem."
The CDA has two principal problems. First, its wording and
phraseology are so unclear as to be void for vagueness. Second, and
more importantly, its standards are overbroad and ill-suited for
cyberspace. Many have decried the advent of online communities for
their potential for harm----:including increased isolationism. Not enough
has been said, however, about the opportunities for bringing people
together. Indeed, many of the limitations set by geography, resources,
and social inhibitions and hierarchies, are non-existent in this new
community. The virtues and opportunities of cyber-communities are
making their way to the populace; now is not the time to inhibit their
evolution.
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